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Lessons Learned from Building 
a High-Assurance Crypto Gateway
The construction of a complex secure system composed 
from both secure and insecure components presents 
a variety of challenges to the designer. The example 
system described here highlights some lessons learned 










I n surveying a dozen developing security prod-ucts in the mid-2000s, it appeared that they all satisfied the basic security requirement for han-dling national security information (National 
Security Telecommunications and Information Sys-
tems Security Committee [NSTISSC] Policy 11), 
which is that they had been “evaluated and validated” 
in accordance with National Information Assurance 
Partnership (NIAP; www.niap-ccevs.org/cc-scheme) 
or other security criteria. However, we found that ad-
ditional untrusted code was needed to integrate these 
products with their deployment environments, result-
ing in uncertified end systems in each case. This broad 
deficiency presented a challenge: to build a complete 
system that met the highest requirements of both Poli-
cy 11 and the NIAP scheme. In our combined 75 years 
of experience in the security R&D community, we’ve 
witnessed almost every new approach to building se-
cure systems that has seen the light of day. The most 
meritorious were cumulative efforts that extended the 
science of computer security, ultimately providing a 
broad menu of technologies with which to address the 
challenge. Thus armed, a new project emerged with 
considerable enthusiasm and optimism, forming the 
background for the several lessons we describe here. 
The goal of the Encryption-box Security System 
(eSS) project was to produce a trusted hardware 
foundation (see the “Trusted Components” sidebar) 
that could be applied to any IP-based network of 
host computers.1 In an eSS, the hosts are called 
arbitrary application processors (AAPs). An eSS adds 
a trusted network security controller (NSC) that 
defines a security policy over 
network communications, and 
trusted encryption gateways (see G 
in Figure 1) that control network 
access by each AAP and NSC and encrypt the related 
session traffic. The NSC policy establishes each 
AAP’s security level and determines which pairs of 
AAPs are allowed to communicate, consistent with 
the security levels. The NSC provides the encryption 
gateways of each such pair with a unique session key. 
The design of the encryption gateways is simplified 
by treating AAPs and NSCs equivalently, as hosts. 
In fact, the key management and encryption actions 
of the gateways don’t require any special input from 
the hosts. An encryption gateway simply renders all 
outgoing cleartext (red) messages into encrypted 
(black) network messages and renders all incoming 
(black) messages into cleartext (red) messages, based 
on the session keys. The NSC, AAPs, and encryption 
gateways can also detect security faults and generate 
messages for an audit server, if one is present. The eSS 
design supports the inclusion of a third-party audit 
server, which is simply another AAP.
The rest of this article uses the lessons learned in 
building eSS to shed light on several high-trust secu-
rity engineering challenges found in the past 50 years, 
presented here in terms of secure architecture, secure 
implementation, and trustworthy development issues.
Secure Architecture
Most modern large-scale systems employ a complex 
organization of distributed components, described 
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variously as a network of networks, a system of sys-
tems, and so on. Each stand-alone node can also be 
comprised of individual functional components such 
as modules, layers, and programs. Key concepts for se-
curity analysis of complex distributed systems include 
the security perimeter, the allocation of policies to 
specific components, and the security policy domain. 
Each trusted computing base (TCB) has a security 
perimeter; one or more TCBs (or subnetworks) with 
common policies can comprise a security policy do-
main. A policy domain helps enforce a set of security 
policies including information flow (noninterference), 
mandatory access control (MAC), and discretionary 
access control (DAC), as well as supporting policies 
such as audit and login. 
The enforcement of a given policy element within 
a policy domain can be allocated to a selected com-
ponent. For example, the audit storage and protection 
policy can be centralized in one component, and the 
DAC policy might be allocated to another compo-
nent. The eSS architecture allocates the MLS policy 
decisions to the NSC, and MLS policy enforcement 
to the encryption gateways, similar to John Rushby’s 
trusted network interface unit.2 Although the NSC 
could equally enforce any policy regarding access to 
host-to-host messages, one of the eSS’s first-order re-
quirements was the ability to support the US national 
confidentiality lattice (ordered security labels such as 
“top secret” [TS], “secret” [S], “confidential” [C], and 
“unclassified” [U], which can be combined with the 
power set of nonordered categories as a cross prod-
uct),3 a form of MLS.
eSS MLS Design Decisions
The designation of particular security labels to vari-
ous system components is a critical design decision for 
an MLS network security architecture (see Figure 1). 
The simplest decision is the labeling of the AAP hosts 
within the architecture because of the design decision 
that each AAP would have a static label. 
The choice of level for encrypted information plays 
a key role. In this project, the developers made two 
design decisions to keep the system simple. The first 
was that all black data and components would have the 
same level; to do otherwise—for example, to label each 
encrypted datum at its native data level—would result 
in a multilevel network and the need for trusted rout-
ers and other intermediate components. The second 
decision was that the level of black data and network 
components would be U, meaning that the network 
itself could be protected as unclassified. In other words, 
it would be acceptable to the security policy if any 
component on the network could read any (encrypt-
ed) data on the network, and unclassified components 
could write to the network (this could support, for 
example, allowing U elements to use the network for 
unencrypted traffic). To choose a label other than U 
for black components would have required protecting 
the network from access by unclassified components. 
A similar analysis holds when you consider an integrity 
policy: if all black data were labeled with the lowest 
integrity level, low-integrity components could both 
read from and write to the network. 
An encryption gateway separates an AAP’s red data 
and actions from the black network. Internally, the 




































Figure 1. Encryption-box Security System (eSS). Each arbitrary application 
processor (AAP) operates at a single security level, in this case, [S]. The 
encryption gateway [G] operates at the security levels of both its attached 
AAP and the network [U].
Trusted Components
A component of a network security architecture may trust, or depend on, another component to perform certain functions. The trustwor-
thiness of the first component is, then, limited by the trustworthiness of 
the other. A trusted component must be verified as being worthy of that 
trust with respect to some criterion for trustworthiness that, itself, has 
been vetted to reflect the concerns of the information stakeholders. The 
trust can range from incidental to security critical. The greater the trust in 
a component, the more rigorous its trustworthiness must be verified. For 
example, in an MLS system, a component that reads and writes a wide 
range of information sensitivity levels must be verified to the highest 
degree to perform only the intended data movements, since the system 
itself depends on the component to maintain the security policy. For the 
Common Criteria, the highest degree is EAL7, which corresponds gener-
ally to a TCSEC classification of A1.
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side. The red side manages the AAP traffic and en-
crypts cleartext data and places it in black-side mes-
sage buffers. The black side then employs the IPsec 
protocol stack to process the message for output to the 
network. Thus, the encryption gateway is allocated 
a security level (such as [U – S]) that spans that of its 
AAP (for example, [S]) and that of the network ([U]), 
resulting in a multilevel device (see “MLS AAP” in 
Figure 1).
The typical AAP is assigned a single sensitiv-
ity level and bears no responsibility for supporting 
the eSS MLS policy. The eSS can support multilevel 
AAP components, which would be somewhat more 
complex. For example, an AAP host might be as-
signed a security level range from U to TS and is then 
trusted to keep separate the individual levels within 
that range, U, C, S, and TS. To support separation, 
a different encryption gateway is used for each sepa-
rate security level that’s configured for the AAP, with 
a single-level internal device to interface with each 
gateway. This approach avoids the need for multilevel 
internal devices. 
There are relatively few choices of accredited, 
high-assurance MLS platforms for hosting an MLS 
AAP, including Integrity and GEMSOS (http://
NIAP-CCEVS.org/CC-Scheme/VPL/). However, 
designers should be wary about attempting to build 
their own trusted host component: it’s possible, but 
only at a considerable cost in labor and time (years).
The eSS project created a formal security policy 
model in the Alloy language, along with a formal 
specification and operational code to match the mod-
el.4 We crafted the architecture to minimize the num-
ber of trusted components—for example, only the 
AAP and the encryption gateway on the red side are 
exposed to classified information. For the encryption 
gateway device, we employed high-grade encryption 
algorithms (AES256 and HMAC SHA-1) that satis-
fied the US National Institute of Standards and Tech-




One of the toughest challenges in designing a dis-
tributed MLS architecture is how to handle two-way 
protocols for transmission of information between 
components with heterogeneous security levels. Most 
communication protocols include data flow in both 
directions, if only to acknowledge message receipt. 
However, lattice-based security policies such as those 
described by the Bell-LaPadula (B&L) model allow 
only one direction of flow between components of 
different levels.5 For example, data may flow from S to 
TS, but not from TS to S. The contradiction between 
the communication protocols’ needs and the policy’s 
restrictions is at the root of many design challenges.
Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP). Our first 
product version was incomplete because we forgot to 
provide for the standard ICMP health messages—the 
pings—that travel between an endpoint such as the 
AAP and one of the network routers. In addition to 
the problem that the black-side router is unclassified 
and the red-side AAP generally is not, ICMP raised 
a major design issue of communication between en-
crypted and non-encrypted data domains. 
An ICMP/IPsec stack resides on each router, en-
cryption gateway, NSC, and AAP. For each communi-
cating pair, the ICMP component on one end generates 
queries that are responded to by the IP stack on the 
other end of the pair. As Figure 2a shows, the problem 
is that the router components don’t know the encryp-
tion keys with which to talk to the AAP (see line of 
communication marked “1”)—likewise, the encryp-
tion gateway would encrypt an AAP response (“2”).
This became a show stopper because the only so-
lution appeared to be to allow high-to-low message 
flow, a significant violation of the eSS security policy. 
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Figure 2. Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) query problem. In this 
example, incoming ICMP messages (shown as line 1 in (a)) cross from U to 
S, and require a decryption operation. Similarly, response messages (shown 
as line 2) cross from S to U, and require an encryption operation. (b) The 
alternative short-circuits the need for cross-domain communication and 
related cryptographic transformation by resolving ICMP messages in the U 
side of the gateway, simplifying the design and avoiding the policy violation 
of S to U communication.
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To solve this, we established an ICMP/IPsec stack on 
both sides (red and black) of each encryption gate-
way. The encryption gateway’s black-side IPsec stack 
intercepts and responds generically (“no op”) to any 
ICMP query from a router to the associated AAP. 
Similarly, the encryption gateway’s red-side IPsec 
stack intercepts and responds to a query from the clas-
sified AAP to a router (the solution is also simplified 
when the AAP is U—in which case, the encryption 
gateway passes ICMP messages to the AAP host for 
its red-side IPsec stack to respond to the query—or 
when ICMP communication goes between two AAP 
end system at the same security level). This eliminates 
the need for two-way communication across security 
levels and resolves the violation of security policy on 
the secure network. 
Covert channels. A “covert channel” is a means of 
signaling over a mechanism that was not intended for 
communication, which violates the security policy. 
Illicit access to an explicitly exported data object is 
considered a design flaw, whereas covert channels are 
based on the modulation of internal values or meta-
data by a high-sensitivity source AAP, which is visible 
to a low-sensitivity sink AAP. A complete security 
design results in complete virtualization of shared 
resources in which there are not any extraneous in-
ternal attributes that could be used to covertly signal 
from high to low. When complete virtualization is 
not possible, the goal is to narrow covert channels to 
acceptable levels. According to historical guidance,6,7 
storage channels above 100 bps must be closed; covert 
storage channels that are less than 10 bps are accept-
able; covert storage channels of 10 to 100 bps should 
be audited for misuse; and covert timing channels, 
which are very difficult to close without crippling sys-
tem performance, must be audited. 
Shared, exported resources. In eSS, the only shared, 
exported resources are the messages flowing through 
the network, which comprise the data objects of the 
access control policy. The first order concern of the 
design was to ensure that the access control over these 
objects was complete and correct. The next concern 
was whether message attributes could be modulated 
to create a covert channel. An easy modulation 
mechanism is the message length, which can be visible 
to unclassified network components such as routers. 
eSS closes that channel by ensuring messages are of a 
standard length. A timing channel results if the source 
AAP can generate messages at known intervals, which 
might be visible to network components as well as 
to end systems in the form of traffic congestion. eSS 
lowers the bandwidth available by generating random 
messages between AAP crypto channels: this isn’t 
a perfect solution, but the resulting covert channel 
bandwidth is acceptable per the guideline.7 
Brave new flows. eSS effectively creates a network 
of single-level subnets, much like virtual private net-
works (VPNs) that can’t interact with each other. 
However, the eSS policy, a variant of the B&L se-
curity policy,5 permits information to flow upward, 
from lower to higher classification levels. This led us 
to wonder whether a constrained form of the two-way 
protocol could enable a more efficient, yet secure, con-
nection between AAPs at different levels: a multilevel 
network. We studied the feasibility of a multilevel 
network in which a canned downward acknowledge-
ment (ACK) message could be allowed in response to 
an originating upward TCP message—assuming the 
overall stream of downward messages is throttled to 
a minimum bandwidth. Although downward mes-
sage flow violates B&L, innovative handling of two-
way network traffic has received serious consideration 
among certifying agencies, such as the US National 
Security Agency (NSA), when the write-downs are 
shown to be tightly limited (to 10 bps or less). This 
sort of ACK policy has many applications to secure 
networks, including that of a trusted guard to manage 
the flow of current-event news to a classified environ-
ment.8 It appears that in the future, the trade-off be-
tween practical increased access to information versus 
possible classified data leakage might permit an ACK 
write-down channel in tightly controlled security 
situations, such as those that are audited or throttled 
by real-time feedback mechanisms—for example, the 
Global Information Grid program9 characterizes this 
change in policy as a shift from “need to know” to 
“need to share.”
Secure Implementation
A secure implementation of any trusted architecture 
component must satisfy a rigorous certification process 
and consider issues such as incomplete design and use 
of breakpoints (see “Common Criteria Evaluation and 
Validation Scheme (CCEVS)” sidebar). 
Incomplete Design
Certification of a product is an exhausting process, 
with increasing rigor required for products that 
separate a broader range of security levels. The most 
critical aspect of certification is to ensure that the 
submitted documentation reflects a complete design. 
A system design specification often shows what the 
system is supposed to do in an ideal environment, 
but in practice, the environment is seldom ideal. A 
complete design specification must therefore describe 
secure behavior when the system or environment 
doesn’t conform to nominal expectations: the burden 
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of complete specification is to ensure that the system 
continues to operate securely over the full range of 
inputs and failure modes. 
Our project experience has shown that roughly 
10 percent of most system specifications describe 
ideal performance, whereas 90 percent describe 
performance under non-ideal circumstances. 
The encryption gateway establishes the initial 
cryptographic keys at both AAPs of a cryptographic 
connection in a series of six or so exchange messages 
before the network becomes operational—that 
is, the keys are initially established in an ideal 
environment. However, if a cryptographic period 
expires, the encryption gateway must be rekeyed, 
which takes many hundreds of trusted messages to 
avoid threats from the operational environment, 
such as attempts to steal rekeying information. Key 
theft isn’t a threat in the initial key exchange, in the 
sense that no users are yet operating—that is, the 
environment is nearly ideal.
Lesson 1. The commercial Internet is the classical 
example of an incomplete design that enables hos-
tile attacks. It was originally designed as a benign 
environment with cooperating users rather than the 
hostile users with which it operates today. Because 
Internet protocols are incomplete with respect to 
their design for response to hostile action, the Inter-
net is a target for attacks ranging from defacement 
by attention-seeking kids to clandestine coordinated 
attacks by teams of government-sponsored, well-
funded attackers. The entire situation is exacerbated 
when maintenance of key components follows the 
“penetrate and patch” strategy often associated with 
office productivity software. 
Breakpoints
Another classical incomplete design for security is the 
popular “breakpoint” function in many debugging 
tools. This function lets a programmer designate target 
instructions in an instrumented program where the 
debugger will stop the program, report on specified 
system and program conditions, and then continue 
executing the instrumented program. A sequence of 
breakpoints can provide great insight as to how the 
program is behaving and is often used to help debug a 
program before it’s tested and released.
In a typical OS, a program executes in one of 
two modes: kernel or user. Kernel mode allows the 
program to execute privileged instructions that affect 
system security. To access all the required system status 
information, the debugger runs in kernel mode—thus, 
it’s a trusted process. Debugging tools are written to 
carefully control the user and instrumented program 
so that kernel mode isn’t abused. Specifically, the 
debugger must be designed to ensure that untrusted 
programs are only executed in user mode. A key flaw 
occurs during the breakpoint function if an instruction 
is executed in kernel mode. 
A malicious programmer can exploit the breakpoint 
flaw as follows (see Figure 3). The programmer defines 
the breakpoint in terms of a malicious transition 
instruction and a benign report sequence (which, 
here, returns the status of three program variables). 
When the program arrives at the breakpoint, the 
debugger executes the report sequence followed by 
the transition instruction. However, the transition 
instruction changes the processor to the kernel mode, 
which permits subsequent instructions to execute 
unconstrained and perform malicious operations. 
Under normal conditions, a program couldn’t 
manipulate the processor mode because it requires a 
privileged instruction; however, breakpoint operates 
in privileged mode, from where the flaw is exploitable. 
Penetration testing unveiled this design flaw.
Lesson 2. Variants of the breakpoint function al-
low this attack because of incomplete design of the 
trusted code that controls program execution. The 
countermeasure is that trusted programs shouldn’t 
allow user programs to operate in kernel mode. This 
problem also points to the lack of assurance in com-
pilers and other development tools. So, another take 
on this lesson would be that untrustworthy develop-
Common Criteria Evaluation  
and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) 
T here are three players in a high-assurance Common Criteria evalua-tion: the vendor prepares the product technical material; the Com-
mon Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) performs the product testing and 
evaluation per the CCEVS; and NSA evaluators confirm the tests meet the 
CCEVS via a series of CCTL/CCEVS structured interactions called valida-
tion oversight reviews (VORs). The product vendor defines a clear, logical 
boundary of the target of evaluation (TOE) and a security functional re-
quirement (SFR) of the security target (ST) to be certified. There must be 
an NSA-acceptable security policy for the ST, for example, Bell-LaPadula 
or a suitable cryptographic policy. The SFR must correspond to the ST 
features, advertising literature, and ST user and administration guides. 
The NSA reviews all test plans, procedures, and results, including pen-
etration tests and senior valuator evidence review. A final VOR concludes 
the CCEVS evaluation with a fail or pass grade. A pass grade results in 
a certificate and a Validated Product Listing (VPL) for the TOE. Further-
more, many deployment environments require a separate certification 
and accreditation process, indicating that the IT products involved (which 
may have separate Common Criteria certifications) are used correctly and 
are suitable for the documented risks.
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ment tools, such as a debugger, shouldn’t be used on 
shared systems. 
Trustworthy Development 
Highly trustworthy development is the single most 
difficult technical issue that separates secure product 
development from general product engineering. 
So what is “trustworthiness?” Essentially, it’s the 
confidence that a product performs as specified and 
does nothing else, satisfying its advertised claim 
even in a hostile environment. This confidence must 
be earned for secure systems, where we consider 
the system trustworthy according to analyses, 
documentation, tests, and correctness proofs validated 
by an independent agency.
Design Model
The Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation 
Scheme (CCEVS) certification process (http://NIAP 
-CCEVS.org) ensures that the design documentation 
(called the security target, or ST) is complete. Yet, 
completeness in a complex system is daunting. Where 
does the designer start? Sequential design refinement 
is one of the primary models for secure product 
development. For security products, the design is built 
in several conceptual stages:
•	Stage 1 is the core set of functions to carry out the 
system’s principal purpose. The goal here is to pro-
vide correct functionality.
•	Stage 2 adds the procedures that result in a secure 
initial state. 
•	Stage 3 adds processing to check all input parameters 
for correct range values and to respond appropriately 
when values are out of range (an error condition). 
•	Stage 4 adds the defensive response for violations in 
stages 2 and 3, for example, alarms, audit messages, 
locking out the user from any further function, and 
clearing all data generated to date for the user. It dis-
ables or repairs any malfunctioning modules, serv-
ing as an error trap state that essentially returns the 
ST to a secure initial state. 
The completion of these stages results in an 
operational system capable of “steady state” processing. 
All security policy rules are imposed at all times and 
all classified boundary crossings are properly checked. 
For high-assurance systems, the correctness and 
completeness of processing is further assured through 
formal verification, discussed next.
Lesson 3. The Common Criteria provides a very 
detailed set of functional requirements for an ST. 
When used correctly, it’s an effective tool to check 
your design, become knowledgeable about the struc-
tured development of requirements, and gain insight 
to what you’ll face during the CCEVS process. 
Formal Specifications
The design model serves as a framework upon which 
to build a set of formal specifications, resulting in a 
two-level formal system: an abstract formal security 
policy model and a more concrete formal top-level 
specification. The formal model and specifications 
are written in a precise mathematical (formal) 
language that allows a rigorous and consistent system 
description; several language options are available.10 
The formal specification language consists 
of well-defined syntax and semantics, and a set 
of language-processing tools that manage the 
specifications and related text. Ideally, the tools 
can automatically generate correctness theorems 
about the specification (that is, the theorems are 
“conjectures” until successfully proved, at which 
point they’re theories). The latter is a significant 
capability because otherwise a thorough manual 
inspection is required to ensure that the hand-crafted 
security theorems are precise and correct—that the 
right thing is ultimately proved.
Today, program code is manually generated 
from formal specifications. A one-to-one formal or 
informal mapping is required between the code and 
the formal specification, an arduous process that might 
be lessened in the future via automatic translation or 
execution of the formal specifications.11 
Lesson 4. The code-to-spec mapping compares the 
formal top-level specification versus the relevant 
code, line by line, side by side in the listing and 
Name Comment
Instruction # normal instruction
Instruction # normal instruction
 Breakpoint  # pseudo instruction, jump to
Set kernel privilege on # Transition instr : set mode to
   privileged
Privileged instr # malicious action
Privileged instr # malicious action
Set kernel privilege off # set mode to user
Instruction # resume normal operation
Instruction # normal instruction
In privileged mode do:
I. Execute Report Sequence
a) Write status var1 # Report on system state
b) Write status var2 # Report on system state
c) Write status var3 # Report on system











        9.
3
3
Figure 3. Breakpoint exploitation. This pseudo code illustrates how breakpoint 
can be misused to transition the system into kernel mode, as in instruction 4, 
thus bypassing the system’s policy enforcement mechanism. 
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with necessary comments to explain correspondence 
quirks of either language. A mapping that shows an 
absence of code for a component of the formal speci-
fication might indicate missing security functions. 
The other alternative—code without corresponding 
specification—might indicate unwanted extra code, 
a Trojan horse, or a trap door. 
Finally, a theorem prover associated with the 
specification language processes the formal model 
and related specifications to discharge the proof 
obligations. Even a relatively simple security target, 
such as the eSS, can require hundreds of pages of 
formal specifications, and the proofs can be a long, 
tedious process. The security policy model’s proof 
shows that it’s consistent with its stated correctness 
criteria (for example, the system only allows secure 
access to resources). The proof of the formal top-level 
specification provides a formal demonstration that it’s 
consistent with the formal model.12 
Theorem generation and proof can uncover 
subtle problems with the system design or with its 
specification when theorems can’t be proved, perhaps 
because the specification is inconsistent or specified 
boundary conditions aren’t broad enough with respect 
to possible values. For example, in an earlier program 
for the US Department of Defense,7 a proposed design 
change would have provided operational flexibility, 
such that the B&L policy could be suspended 
in emergency conditions—innocuously, it was 
thought—and restored after the emergency passed. 
The proposed policy change satisfied the 
operational imperative, but it introduced a subtle 
inconsistency that made it impossible to prove the 
security theorems correct, thus halting progress of 
the formal proofs and the project itself. This problem 
became a cause celebre until a resolution could be 
formulated. The B&L policy defines restrictions 
regarding both security levels (MAC) and individuals 
(DAC). To resolve the problem, we modified the 
design change to apply to DAC only. Thus, we were 
able to enforce the MAC rules at all times and found 
that relaxation of the DAC rules was sufficient for 
operational needs during the emergency condition. 
This solution required additional effort to redefine the 
emergency security policy formally, but it resulted in 
consistent theorems that we proved to be true—plus, 
it delighted the customer.
Lesson 5. Flaws found by formal methods usually 
aren’t as dramatic as code flaws found during test-
ing. An initial-conditions theorem might not prove 
because the conditions are too constrained to per-
mit proof. Alternatively, they might be too weak— 
underconstrained—and allow any state to satisfy the 
specifications. Finally, the functional specifications 
for transitions to new states might not correspond to 
the formally specified initial or terminal states.
Security Testing
Each correspondence step—from model to policy, 
from specification to model, and from code to speci-
fication—brings further evidence of the product’s 
trustworthiness. However, the security code isn’t the 
functioning product: there must also be a binding be-
tween the source code and the system in execution. 
This is the domain of security testing.
Lesson 6. We divide testing into three parts: func-
tional testing that shows the code’s correct function-
ality, security testing that shows the omnipresent 
security policy enforcement even under hostile con-
ditions, and penetration testing that attempts to show 
any security vulnerabilities in the code, such as in-
correct or incomplete policy enforcement and other 
anomalies that are the sustenance of the code hacker. 
Some people have observed that functional testing 
shows the strength of the good guys, whereas pen-
etration testing shows the strength of the bad guys. 
Our penetration testing revealed that attackers 
could hack the encryption gateway, a case of 
incomplete design. The design called for establishing 
the initial crypto keys over the network before there 
were any external users. However, the absence of users 
couldn’t be guaranteed, thus, malicious users might 
be able to log on surreptitiously and capture the keys. 
The solution was to add a removable cryptographic 
token (a key on a microSD memory card) for each 
AAP and NSC. This foiled any hacker attempts, as 
without a physical token a given host couldn’t access 
the network.
Lesson 7. We can liken a secure system to a security 
utopia that operates perfectly when its assumptions 
are met and it’s perfectly initiated. But like all uto-
pias, the question arises as to how you get it started, 
securely. A classic attack strategy is to perform a legal 
operation that causes the utopia to restart, but this 
time with the hacker camped on the initiation se-
quence when the system’s guard is down. 
Commercial Development
Our experience is that industrial-strength 
software development using the Common Criteria 
requirements paradigm can be very high quality. As 
discussed, much of this process is based on rigorous 
use of model-based development, design reviews, 
state transition analyses, and other diagrammatical 
tools. Trusted software must also be very tightly 
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configuration-controlled using high-quality tools 
because of the large number of objects to be controlled 
compared to those found in typical nontrustworthy 
projects. Although usual commercial practices work 
well for myriad products in many contexts, it doesn’t 
match the NIAP CCEVS process in eliminating 
coding errors, security flaws, and Trojan horses. 
Assurance against the latter in particular differentiates 
the discipline of high-assurance security from that of 
product safety. In the end, commercial practice can 
be very good—a less expensive compromise than 
some of the CCEVS methods—but we’re hopeful 
that advances in development tools might enable 
commercial use of CCEVS methods in the future. 
Overall, rigorous development methods work 
considerably better than ad hoc schemes, but we pay 
a price for that rigor. In system development’s early 
days, when the system failed to work as desired, we 
said, “now that we understand the problem, we can 
write the programs again.” The rigor provided by 
trustworthy development is like doing the job mul-
tiple times, concurrently. The system is instantiated at 
several different levels of abstraction simultaneously, 
and the developer’s job is to ensure that these instanti-
ations are consistent. Modeling, formal specifications, 
coding, correspondence analysis, testing, and opera-
tional guides provide the different system instantia-
tions. For eSS, all of these tasks covered a seven-year 
development period.
We built various aspects of eSS as prototypes 
running on our internal network. These experiments 
led to many areas of incomplete and even wrong 
design, providing valuable lessons. In constructing the 
formal model and specification, we found errors in 
our design and incomplete states, mostly dealing with 
key distribution and attack vulnerabilities. Trusted 
initial key distribution was the biggest issue that led 
to a new design based on a physical ignition key for 
each encryption gateway. The Common Criteria 
was our “bible,” always close by to keep us focused 
on proper design. Writing the code from the formal 
specification was relatively easy and straightforward, 
although it required some adjustment in the I/O code 
to interface with the limited rate initial production 
(LRIP) microprocessor we selected. We built six 
prototype encryption gateways and a closed network 
to run extensive system testing before selecting the 
LRIP processor. After that, we found few errors in 
the code; those that did occur were related to the 
anomalies of compilation tools. 
Lesson 8. A large class of the anomalies found in our 
code resulted from our choice to drop all the open 
source C++ library macros and write the needed 
macro code ourselves from scratch. This closed a 
possible Trojan horse or trapdoor insertion vulner-
ability, but increased code writing and testing. 
We spent many weeks on penetration testing trying 
to break the system. The system performed so well, 
we used recorded unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) 
video as the AAP data flow between simulated S and 
TS sites, and also used the video as part of the product 
demonstration to management. We were excited, 
with our live tests proving out the value of long years 
of work. The final steps for us were to complete the 
evaluation and attain a Common Criteria certificate 
for eSS.
We studied the NIAP CC Testing Laboratories 
(CCTL) list, made our choice, and contracted with 
one that had extensive network and encryption 
experience. We entered the first phase of the NIAP 
certification process and prepared the necessary 
information for the NSA validation oversight review 
(VOR). We completed all of the secure and trusted 
engineering and were on the verge of Common 
Criteria certification success. 
Lesson 9. The biggest lesson to be learned from this 
project was hard. Before we completed product cer-
tification, management cut off our funding. Their 
justification for this surprise was that there was no 
market for our product. A few months later, on 
17 December 2009, the following article appeared 
in The Wall Street Journal: “Insurgents Hack U.S. 
Drones.” The article noted the insurgents intercepted 
the cleartext video images from operational Ameri-
can drones using a $26 commercial software pack-
age called “SkyGrabber,” made by Russian vendor 
Sky Software. The lack of encryption—equivalent 
to that of eSS—allowed this attack. The key lesson 
learned was to always make senior management part 
of the development team, so that their commitment 
to the project and to the market is clear.
W hile the result of the subject project was not taken to market, it nevertheless provided a foundation 
for confirmation and demonstration of the high-
assurance development techniques we have discussed. 
As the need for high-assurance technology becomes 
The proposed policy change satisfied the 
operational imperative, but it introduced a subtle 
inconsistency that made it impossible to prove the 
security theorems correct.
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clearer, and subsequent secure products are developed, 
we hope that these lessons will help to light the way 
for those who follow. 
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